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Abstract: Since the passage of the Organic Law of Village
Committees in 1987, direct election of village leaders has been
conducted in China, and eventually reached a national scale after ten
years’ experiment. However, rural women’s political participation is
discouraged by the social and economic reality in the countryside.
Taking a historical retrospect, this research project attempts to
analyze the impact of Cultural Revolution and Economic Reform on
rural women’s voting rates and representation in local governments
in post-Mao China. The results show that these two landmark political
and social transformation in the 20th century have reinforced
traditional gender roles, excluded rural women from power, and
posed additional barriers to their political involvement by introducing
new problems such as landlessness.
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Introduction
Although widely criticized for its social and political chaos,
the Cultural Revolution is believed to have enhance women’s
autonomy and socio-economic status through a party-led feminist
agenda. Guided by Mao’s famous proclamation that “women [can]
hold up half the sky” women were massively mobilized into the labor
force and politics, with the largest number of women being promoted
to cadres status in 1962 and 11% of rural party branches having
women as either party or deputy party secretaries in 1975 (Rosen
1995: 334). Yet, after Mao’s death and the reformers’ rise to power,
the average number of women recruited into rural party branches
dropped from 13.5% between 1966-1976 to 8.6% in the next five
years, and currently, only 1% of all village committee chairs are
women despite the gender affirmative action enforced in the local
elections (Howell 2006).
Such rapid removal of women from power presents an
intriguing question that requires a deeper analysis of history that goes
beyond the discourse of cultural norms (e.g strict gender roles,
women’s “inferiority” to men and lack of self-confidence) and
education levels. My hypothesis is that the state-oriented nature of the
Cultural Revolution, which only sees the utilitarian value in women
and ignores the deeply-embedded gender problem, has not only
determined the failure of securing any gendered breakthrough
achieved for this period but also created huge barriers to women’s
future political involvement. The economic reform with its market
and money-driven ideology further weakens rural women’s incentive
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to engage in politics, and the subsequent introduction of household
responsibility system and rural land polices, combined with other
social factors (e.g media emphasis on a return to “femininity” and
recruitment of inexperienced women into local political bureaus), all
served to restrict women’s political participation and reinforce gender
stereotype of only men being capable of doing politics.
Literature Review
Most papers examining rural women’s low political
participation in China analyzed the problem through the lens of
cultural norms and institutional inequality. The patriarchal system
(Altindal 2009), low incomes and education level (Zhang, Wang, and
Liu 2009), Confucian values (Zhou and Gong 2014), as well as the
lack of systemic support (Li 2015) are all factors that confine
women’s role in politics and their level of involvement. For example,
Pang (2014) concludes community norms, level of poverty and the
perceived low quality of women in terms of education levels and
ability as main reasons for the low voting rates of village women in
Ningxia Autonomous Region. Similarly, Sargeson and Jacka (2017)
demonstrate that low democratic quality combined with weak
financial resources and institutions impede women’s substantive
representation in village elections. Insightful as they are, few of those
articles have considered this issue from a historical perspective, or
linked the ideological and structural barriers to the effect of Cultural
Revolution and Economic Reform. What’s missing in their analysis
is a more nuanced view on the hidden danger built into the system
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during this period that has become more transparent and detrimental
as time proceeds.
Among the articles that did provide a historical context, the
emphasis is on the effect of Cultural Revolution and Economic
Reform on gender inequality that significantly limited rural women’s
earning ability and educational opportunities. Only a few of them
establish a direct relationship between these two historical incidents
and women’s political participation, with Zhou’s (1993) research on
the conditions regarding women cadres in Xiantao Municipality in
Hubei Province most relevant to this research. In her survey, Zhou
provides detailed year-by year data on the promotion of women
cadres from 1949-1985 and separates her analysis into three parts,
covering the period before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution.
The implementation of household responsibility system, the
weakening of mass organizations, and the party’s reduced incentive
to recruit women are shown as reasons for the decline of women’s
party membership. In this paper, a similar time framework will be
adopted. With a close examination of these two historical incidents
and their impact on rural women’s lives, a more comprehensive
understanding of the social and political reality faced by those women
can be obtained, as well as their ability and willingness to engage in
politics.
Cultural Revolution
1) State Feminism
Since its inception, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
at least outwardly championed a feminist agenda, propagating slogans
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that advance women’s liberation and gender equality. However, the
party’s strategy to mobilize women into heavy industry was a clear
response to the radical policy of rapid industrialization that required
massive labor force. Women, who were in Mao’s vision a wasted
reservoir of labor, were indoctrinated to “hold up half the sky” and
work side by side with their male counterpart in nation-building. As
Deng Yingchao, Vice President of the All-China Women’s
Federation during the 1950s and 1960s, emphasized in 1953, “women
increasingly participated in heavy industry as a result of answering
the state’s call” (Jin, Manning, and Chu 2006: 614). The
transformation of gender division and women’s increasing visibility
in politics were the consequence of such mobilization, rather than the
aim.
Ironically, women’s participation in labor did not translate
into adequate protection of their rights, or the eradication of
Confucian-patriarchal ideology. The slogan that “men and women are
the same, and women comrades can achieve whatever men comrades
can achieve” simply dismissed the cultural and political obstacles that
were unique to Chinese women. The so-called “gender equality” was
achieved through the muscularization of women, who were
encouraged to take men as the norm and suppress their feminine
characters to make themselves more competitive.
2) Iron Girl Movement
Perhaps no example can demonstrate the previous point
better than the Iron Girl Movement during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76). Rural women, in particular, were recruited into single-sex
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brigades to work in oil fields and transportation. Although they
received widespread party recognition, the assigned work exceeded
most women’s physical capacity, and resulted in serious illness that
eventually led to the disband of many specialized teams (Jin, Manning,
and Chu 2006). Even the party-led All-China Women’s Federation
(ACWF) expressed its criticism in a report, where the movement was
said to “harm the protection of women and their labor enthusiasm for
long periods” (Jin, Manning, and Chu 2006: 622).
Even when performing as well as if not better than men,
women received less work points for the same hours, and women
faced with the double burden of work and family responsibility.
Married women in the countryside were excluded from brigades
because they were denigrated as backward and non-revolutionary for
doing housework and providing childcare. Many sent-down youth
were shocked by rural women’s subordination and the persistence of
gender inequality in the village (Entwisle and Henderson 2000). Since
entrenched patriarchal ideas and customs were so entrenched, rural
women’s political participation faced stronger male resistance as they
refused to recruit and train women in the party due to the alleged lack
of political consciousness and experience (Keshena 2012). Many
women cadres that were promoted to higher level party position were
sent-down youth instead of local women because of the former
group’s higher education level and degree of freedom.
3) All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF)
As the first nationwide women’s organization, ACWF was
established in 1949 to promote women’s social and economic status
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in China under the party’s supervision. In the early years of formation,
the ACWF remained relatively independent and was able to challenge
the party’s narrative, although not without limit. For example, when
CCP leaders asserted that women’s continued role in doing domestic
work contradicted the Marxist–Leninist ideology, ACWF contested
that under the current economic condition, not all women could be
offered a job, and by carrying out family responsibility, they
nevertheless contributed to the development of socialism (Tsui 1998).
The Five Good Family Campaign was subsequently introduced in
1956 to acknowledge women’s effort in taking care of families and
the importance of their work to the state.
With the creation of ACWF, women cadres were recruited
into the organization at all levels, and responsible for “women’s work”
such as family planning and education. In fact, the position held by
women cadres in the countryside before 1966 was mostly in this area,
and promotion to the rank of commissioner or director in the local
Women’s Federation seems to be the only possibility for female party
members, which created a huge limitation to rural women’s political
participation that still exists today (Zhou 1993). During the Cultural
Revolution, ACWF was shut down and completely absorbed into the
party framework. Women’s problems were no longer recognized as
separate issues, but a part of the class struggle that would be
simultaneously resolved with the success of the revolution.
4) Implication For Rural Women’s Political Participation
Women’s participation in labor force and politics before and
during the Cultural Revolution demonstrates the process through
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which the party successfully overrides traditional patriarchal
authority with its own authority. For rural women, the socialist
revolution had left the patriarchal system intact and condoned such
exploitation of labor within the family. Those women remained
heavily dependent on their husbands and burdened by the traditional
gender roles. After Mao’s death, the “iron girl” was ridiculed in
popular literature for being repulsively muscularized and anti-human
nature. Retrieving one’s own femininity became a progressive
attitude, and gender differentiation was actually favored by women in
clothing, occupation and social roles. Although many of them joined
the party, their political power was restrained in the Women’s
Federation, and thus unable to reach other male-dominated fields such
as economic planning.
The transformation of ACWF into a party organ that is
completely under the state’s control also hinders rural women’s
involvement in politics as sometimes the project conceived by the
federation focuses more on maintaining social stability and promoting
local economic growth, rather than encouraging women’s education
and enhancing their political awareness (Zhou 1993). Rural women
are shown to have distant relationships with the local Women’s
Federation because of “its weak political functions and their
emotional detachment from it” (Huang 2018: 259). Acting as the
state’s agent, the Women’s Federation’s role in promoting rural
women’s political participation proved to be very limited (Huang
2018).
The Economic Reform
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1) Overview
The Economic Reform, introduced since 1978, has brought
new prosperity to China. Divided into two stages, the reform
decollectivized agriculture and opened up the country to foreign
investment in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and privatized the stateowned industry in the next decade. The era is characterized by rapid
change in socioeconomic and political structure, rural migration to
major cities, and a slight shift in the collectivistic ideology. For rural
women, the reform is a double-edged sword as they enjoyed more
freedom in production, but were further bound by their family
responsibility and the entire household.
2) Household Responsibility System
Launched in the 1980s, the Household Responsibility
System contracted land owned by the People’s Communes to private
hands, and peasants were able to exercise control over their own land
under certain requirements. After the improved productivity
generated by the system created labor surplus in agriculture, many
women voluntarily engaged in sideline work at home, activities that
were banned by the government before the reform. They raised pigs,
grow vegetables, and gather chicken eggs, and doing whatever work
they deemed as manageable. According to research conducted in
Daqiuzhuang, a rural village that is approximately 50 kilometers from
the city of Tianjin, 95% of the local women participated in the
collective agriculture labor force prior to 1980. But by 1988, 84% of
married women left the workforce to become housewives (Zhang and
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Ma 1988). The physical hardship rural women endured during the
years in heavy industry also hastened such retreat and reinforced the
notion that women are naturally unsuitable for certain jobs, an
ideological barrier that still discourages rural women’s political
participation today. Compared to the pre-reform period, rural women
enjoyed more freedom as they no longer faced the double burden of
commune work and housework. Sideline production proved to be
extremely profitable in the early reform years, and more and more
women chose to stay at home instead of attending school, which
resulted in a decline in overall school attendance rates and a
corresponding increase in the inequality between male and female
education level in the countryside (Luo 1997).
The party propaganda also changed its narrative from
encouraging rural women to participate in the labor force to
emphasizing a honorable return to the family, and the success of
women who engaged in sideline works. For example, an article titled
“Mrs. Xie Fu and her long haired rabbits” was published by the
Women’s Federation in 1979, in which Mrs. Xie’s story of raising
rabbits and selling their furs for 530 yuan, a huge amount of money
based on the standard of that time, was praised as a model for
emulation (Watson 1992). However, the diversification of incomegenerating activities have deprived those women of their time to
engage in public affairs. It becomes more difficult for the ACWF and
other party organizations to recruit women who are bound entirely
within their household (Luo 1997). Interest in politics and voting
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declines as women become more concerned with making money to
improve the welfare of their own families in a new economic order.
In general, the decollectivization of agriculture directly led
to the resurfacing of strict gender roles and an old patriarchal belief
of “nanzhuwai, nuzhunei” (man managing the affairs outside home
and woman inside) in the village. Rural women were ascribed with
the new role of being virtuous housewives that result in lower
educational level and decreased interest in public affairs. The
shrinking value of crops and livestock in later years when the
agriculture market becomes more mature and competitive makes
those women even more dependent on their employed husbands. AllChina Women’s Federation and the National Bureau of Statistics have
shown that the average gender income gap in rural areas increased to
more than 40% between 1990 and 2000, partly because women had
become the main labor force in agriculture, the least proﬁtable sector
of the economy (Sargeson 2006). A vicious cycle is thus created, with
limited initiatives from local Women’s Federation to mobilize any
change.
3) Free Labor Market
The creation of a free labor market has two major
implications on rural women’s political participation. First, women
faced severe discrimination in employment as managers acted with
their own discretion and favored men in the selection process, who
were considered as more stable, reliable and hard-working. When
labor surplus became a huge concern in the early 1980s, some
sociologists and economists openly proposed that “the high rate of
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women’s employment was ‘unsuitable’ for the Chinese economy at
that stage and suggested that women should return home to make
room for men” (Zheng 1997: 130). The communist party, following
the same logic, reduced the number of women cadres recruited from
the countryside. The new era, it is said, demanded “warlike” and
“entrepreneurial” spirits, qualities that rural women lacked , and the
majority of women cadres were thus swept away in the countryside
(Rosen 1995). In a study of Xiantao Municipality (formerly Mianyang
county) in Hubei Province, the exclusion of women from local party
branch is cited as one major reason for the decline in the number of
female brigade head from ninety-three in the late 1979 to only twelve
in 1990 (Rosen 1995).
In addition, with the rapid economic development in urban
areas, men and unmarried young women in the countryside migrated
to the cities in search of better job opportunities. The intensification
of women’s work due to male migrant labor further reduced their
incentives to participate in politics, and develop their career in this
field. Most sent-down youth had also left the village to pursue a more
promising future, and the reservoir of young, educated women in the
rural areas had disappeared completely since the early years of the
reform (Rosen 1995). One unintended consequence of such depletion
of human resources is that when the party policy once again favored
the promotion of women cadres, it’s hard to find anyone eligible
within the local party branches. As a result, “some teachers were
turned overnight into county or bureau heads,” but many of them were
simply unprepared for the new responsibility (Zhou 1993: 60). It was
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exactly at this time that the criticism of the poor quality of women
cadres began to appear.
4) The Land Management Law of 1998
Introduced in 1998 in response to farmers’ reluctance to
invest in land over which they didn’t have secure control, the Land
Management Law established a thirty-year land use right for all
farmers, and strongly discouraged land readjustment. Although the
law successfully increased agriculture production, it caused many
rural women to be landless when they get married as there would be
no increase in the family’s total land allocation with the arrival of a
daughter-in-law (Song and Dong 2010). Divorced and widowed
women had even more limited access to farmland because of their
separation from husbands, and exclusion from the natal families by
local tradition. It is concluded by many studies on rural women’s land
ownership that those who lack a claim to land are more dependent on
their partners and at significantly higher risk of domestic violence
(Song and Dong 2010). Such reliance only serves to reinforce the
patriarchal structure already entrenched in the village, and rural
women are reported to lose autonomy in village election when they
are forced to vote for the predominantly male candidates favored by
their husbands and father-in-law (Pang, Zeng, and Rozelles 2013). As
a result, there has been no incentive for those women to cast a ballot,
and no opportunity for women cadres to rise to any leadership
position in the village.
Conclusion
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The low political participation of rural women presents a
huge challenge to gender equality and women’s welfare in the
countryside.

The

historical

roots

of

the

ideological

and

socioeconomic barriers to a higher level of involvement are explored
in this paper as being the Cultural Revolution and the Economic
Reform that did not aim for women’s emancipation or increase their
say in domestic politics. Rural women were further trapped in their
household, and unable to express their opinions through voting. More
specific policies should be enacted to protect women’s safety in
family and their access to political power.
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